The Hannibal Logic: State Sacrifice, the Ron Arad Legacy, and the Ethics of the Captive Soldier in Israeli Military Doctrine

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This paper examines the evolution of Israeli military doctrine regarding captured personnel, centered on the transition from the national trauma of Ron Arad to the implementation of the controversial Hannibal Directive. For decades, the Israeli ethos was defined by a commitment to leave no soldier behind, a sentiment that led to massive, disproportionate prisoner exchanges. However, the 1986 disappearance of navigator Ron Arad created a permanent scar on the national psyche, signaling the high strategic cost of a live captive in the hands of non-state actors. This study investigates the institutional shift toward "state sacrifice"—the cold calculation that a dead soldier is preferable to a captive one. By analyzing historical precedents, the technical mechanics of the Hannibal Directive, and its reported reactivation during the events of October 7, 2023, the research explores the moral and political consequences of a state prioritizing geopolitical leverage over the lives of its own citizens. It further scrutinizes how this doctrine has transformed from a tactical military protocol into a tool of psychological warfare, ultimately questioning the social contract between a conscripted citizenry and a state that may, under specific conditions, authorize their neutralization to prevent a strategic defeat.

Keywords: Hannibal Directive, Ron Arad, Israeli Defense Forces, Prisoner of War Policy, Ethics of Sacrifice, Military Intelligence, Asymmetric Warfare, October 7, Psychological Warfare, Middle East Security.

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1. Introduction: The Ghost of Ron Arad

The history of the Israeli Defense Forces is punctuated by moments of tactical brilliance and strategic triumph, yet few events have left a more indelible mark on the national consciousness than the ejection of an F-4 Phantom II over Lebanon on October 16, 1986. While the pilot, Yishai Aviram, was rescued in a spectacular display of military coordination, the navigator, Ron Arad, vanished into the custody of the Lebanese Amal Movement. This event did not merely represent the loss of a skilled weapon systems officer; it marked the beginning of a forty-year trauma that would fundamentally reconfigure the ethical and operational DNA of the Israeli state. Arad became the "ghost" of the Israeli military—a soldier neither dead nor returned, whose image would haunt every subsequent negotiation and military engagement.

For the Israeli public, the disappearance of Ron Arad signaled a terrifying shift in the nature of warfare. The traditional Zionist promise that the state would move heaven and earth to return a son to his family appeared to have been broken. As years of silence stretched into decades, the "Missing in Action" status of Arad transformed from a personnel issue into a strategic vulnerability. The enemy learned that a single live captive could hold an entire nation hostage, forcing lopsided prisoner exchanges that many in the security establishment viewed as a threat to national stability.

This section explores the transition from the era of "no man left behind" to the emergence of the "Hannibal" logic. It argues that the failure to recover Arad created a vacuum of certainty that the military sought to fill with a cold, preventative doctrine. The ghost of Ron Arad stands as the foundational justification for the Hannibal Directive, representing the state's resolve to never again allow a soldier to become a permanent bargaining chip. In the eyes of the defense establishment, the strategic cost of Arad's capture was so high that it necessitated a protocol where the life of the individual could be sacrificed to preserve the interests of the collective. This tension between the sacred duty to the soldier and the cold requirements of statecraft serves as the central thesis of this study.

2. Historical Context: The Cost of the Exchange

The shift toward the Hannibal logic did not occur in a vacuum; it was a direct reaction to what the Israeli defense establishment viewed as the catastrophic strategic consequences of the 1985 Jibril Agreement. In this exchange, Israel released 1,150 security prisoners—including high-ranking militants responsible for major attacks—in exchange for just three Israeli soldiers captured during the First Lebanon War. The internal fallout was immense. Military commanders argued that such disproportionate ratios incentivized further abductions, essentially putting a "bounty" on the head of every Israeli soldier. The agreement was seen as a blow to national

deterrence and a surrender to the psychological leverage of non-state actors. This perceived weakness created a desperate need within the high command to find a way to break the cycle of abduction and extortion.

Furthermore, the psychological burden of "Missing in Action" status began to weigh more heavily on Israeli society than the finality of death in combat. In a small, conscripted society where the army is often referred to as "the people's army," the uncertainty of a soldier's fate creates a unique kind of national paralysis. Unlike a fallen soldier whose family can find closure through mourning, a captive soldier like Ron Arad becomes a permanent, open wound. This "limbo" state forces the government into a position of constant vulnerability, where every piece of hearsay or grainy photograph can be used by an enemy to manipulate public opinion and drive a wedge between the citizenry and the state.

By the mid-1980s, the emergence of the need for a definitive, if tragic, end to capture attempts became a matter of high-level debate. The security cabinet began to prioritize the prevention of the "Arad scenario" over the immediate survival of the individual soldier. The logic was cold but consistent: if a soldier is killed during a rescue or an attempt to foil their abduction, the state faces a tragedy that it knows how to process. If a soldier is successfully taken into the "hall of mirrors" of deep captivity, the state faces a strategic crisis that can last decades. This historical context provides the bridge between the traditional Zionist ethos of mutual responsibility and the birth of a directive that would eventually authorize the state to fire upon its own.

3. The Birth of the Hannibal Directive (1986)

The formalization of the Hannibal Directive in 1986 was an exercise in strategic desperation, drafted in the shadows of the General Staff by three high-ranking officers: Yossi Peled, Gabi Ashkenazi, and Yaakov Amidror. These men, each a veteran of Israel’s brutal guerrilla wars in Lebanon, sought to codify a set of rules that would prevent the next Ron Arad. The directive was never intended to be a public document; it was a "black" protocol, whispered through the chain of command and understood by field officers as a license to prioritize the prevention of a kidnapping over the life of the kidnapped. By creating a standardized response to an abduction in progress, the military high command aimed to strip away the hesitation that often allows a captor to escape into the safety of a civilian urban center or across a border.

The semantic ambiguity of the directive was its most defining and dangerous feature. The order instructed soldiers to "foil the abduction by all means," a phrase that in military parlance is synonymous with maximum force. However, it carefully avoided the explicit command to "kill the captive." This linguistic shield allowed the military to maintain a veneer of commitment to the soldier’s safety while effectively authorizing its negation. Sub-sections of the protocol

clarified that fire should be directed at the wheels of a getaway vehicle or the legs of the captors, but it also acknowledged that in the heat of a "zero-second" decision, the risk to the captive was absolute. This ambiguity created a culture where field commanders understood that they would be more harshly judged for allowing a soldier to be taken than for accidentally killing them in the attempt to prevent it.

The original intended scope of the directive was strictly tactical and geographically confined. It was designed for the "SLA" (South Lebanon Army) security zone, where the window between an ambush and the disappearance of a soldier into the labyrinth of Lebanese villages was measured in minutes. It was a tool for the border, a "break glass in case of emergency" measure to be used against Hezbollah snatch-squads. However, the logic of Hannibal proved to be infectious. Over the following decades, the directive drifted from its tactical roots in the Lebanese bush into the core of IDF doctrine, eventually being applied to urban warfare in Gaza and, ultimately, to the defense of sovereign Israeli territory inside the Green Line.

4. The Ron Arad Hall of Mirrors: Intelligence and Conspiracy

The search for Ron Arad transformed from a military recovery operation into a multi-decade intelligence saga defined by disinformation, high-stakes abductions, and the shadowy involvement of regional powers. For forty years, the Israeli intelligence community lived within a hall of mirrors where every lead was potentially a trap or a piece of psychological warfare designed by Tehran or Beirut. The early years of his captivity were marked by sporadic signals of life—handwritten letters and grainy photographs delivered through intermediaries—that served to keep the Israeli public in a state of agonizing hope. These fragments, however, soon gave way to a total intelligence blackout, fueling a vacuum that was quickly filled by conspiracy theories and state-sponsored myths.

Central to this era was the role of Iran and the Lebanese militias in maintaining the mystery. As Arad was reportedly moved from the custody of the Amal Movement to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, his value as a strategic asset skyrocketed. The conspiracy-leaning interpretation suggests that Arad was not merely a prisoner, but a long-term insurance policy for the Iranian regime, to be traded only in exchange for the most extreme concessions, such as the unfreezing of billions in state assets. This narrative suggests that even if Arad had died early in his captivity, the myth of his survival was far more valuable to his captors than the truth, allowing them to extract decades of intelligence and diplomatic maneuvering from a grieving nation.

This atmosphere of uncertainty provided the ultimate justification for the use of human bargaining chips by the Israeli state. The kidnappings of Mustafa Dirani and Sheikh Abdul-Karim

Obeid were presented to the Israeli public as necessary actions to secure Arad's release, yet critics view these operations as the moment the state descended into the same lawless tactics as its adversaries. By participating in this cycle of state-sponsored kidnapping, Israel effectively validated the logic that individuals—whether their own soldiers or foreign nationals—could be reduced to mere currency. The Arad case thus became the psychological foundation for a state that, having been burned by the unknown, decided that the only way to regain control was through the absolute, and often violent, prevention of any future "missing" status.

5. Operationalizing the Directive: Case Studies

The practical application of the Hannibal Directive moved from theoretical abstraction to brutal reality during several key incidents along the Lebanese border and within the Gaza Strip. One of the most significant early tests occurred in October 2000, during the Hezbollah kidnapping at Har Dov. In this instance, three Israeli soldiers were abducted from a patrol vehicle in a sophisticated ambush. While the directive was technically in place, the speed of the Hezbollah withdrawal into the rugged Lebanese terrain—and a series of communication failures within the IDF—meant that the window for "foiling" the abduction closed almost immediately. The subsequent years of uncertainty regarding the soldiers' fate, which ended only with a 2004 prisoner swap for their remains, reinforced the military command's belief that a more aggressive, immediate application of force was necessary to prevent a repeat of the Arad or Har Dov scenarios.

The 2006 capture of Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser served as another turning point, ultimately triggering the Second Lebanon War. In the moments following the ambush of their Humvee, IDF forces initiated a "Hannibal" response, which included massive artillery fire and an immediate tank pursuit into Lebanese territory. The tank itself struck a massive landmine, killing four more soldiers. This case study highlights the devastating internal logic of the directive: the attempt to prevent the "strategic defeat" of a kidnapping often leads to an escalation that results in even greater loss of life. For the high command, however, the casualties incurred during a failed rescue were viewed as a tactical cost, whereas the successful abduction of Regev and Goldwasser was a national catastrophe that dictated the country's foreign policy for years.

Perhaps the most scrutinized operationalization of the directive occurred during Operation Protective Edge in 2014, in what became known as Black Friday in Rafah. Following the suspected abduction of Lieutenant Hadar Goldin into a Hamas tunnel, the IDF unleashed an unprecedented barrage of fire on the surrounding residential areas to cut off escape routes. The logic was pure Hannibal: destroy the entire sector to ensure the captors could not spirit the soldier away. The result was the deaths of scores of Palestinian civilians and the ultimate death

of Goldin himself. Analysis of field commanders' interpretations in these moments reveals a consistent pattern where the safety of the captive is effectively disregarded in favor of neutralizing the "threat" of their captivity. These cases demonstrate that "all means necessary" had evolved into a doctrine of total destruction, where the distinction between saving a soldier and ensuring their death had become dangerously blurred.

6. The Ethical Crisis: The Soldier as Equipment

The implementation of the Hannibal Directive represents a fundamental breakdown of the traditional Zionist social contract, which was built on the ethos of mutual responsibility between the state and its conscripted citizens. For decades, the Israeli public operated under the assumption that while the soldier protects the state, the state remains bound by an absolute moral obligation to protect the individual life of that soldier. The revelation that a secret protocol authorized the targeting of a captured comrade effectively reclassified the soldier from a human agent with inherent rights to a piece of strategic equipment that must be neutralized if it falls into enemy hands. This shift reflects a move away from Kantian ethics—which posits that a person must always be an end in themselves and never merely a means to an end—toward a cold, state-level utilitarianism.

In this utilitarian framework, the survival of the individual is weighed against the potential damage their captivity might inflict on the collective. The "damage" in question is not merely tactical; it is the psychological and political leverage gained by the captor. By viewing the soldier as a potential liability, the state justifies the use of lethal force to prevent a "strategic defeat." This creates a profound moral paradox for the individual soldier on the ground. A combatant is trained to risk their life for their comrades, yet the Hannibal logic suggests that the most "loyal" act a soldier can perform in the face of abduction is to be killed by their own side. This subversion of the military bond of trust has led to significant internal debate within the IDF, as soldiers grapple with the reality that their own command may prioritize their death over their capture.

Public reaction to the revelation of the directive's existence has been characterized by a mixture of shock and a grim acceptance of the "necessity" of the state's harshness. However, the ethical crisis deepens when the directive is applied in civilian-populated areas, as seen in the 2014 and 2023 conflicts. When the state authorizes "all means necessary" to stop an abduction, it often results in the deaths of non-combatants and the captive alike. This suggests that the state has not only abandoned the individual soldier but has also embraced a form of total war where the distinction between "protection" and "neutralization" has vanished. The soldier, once the ultimate symbol of national pride and protection, is reduced in the Hannibal logic to a biological

asset whose primary value is measured by the degree to which they can be kept out of enemy hands—dead or alive.

7. The "Revocation" and Rebranding of 2016

The official status of the Hannibal Directive underwent a significant shift in 2016 following years of mounting internal criticism and a scathing State Comptroller's report on the 2014 Gaza war. This report, which scrutinized the military's conduct during Operation Protective Edge, highlighted the profound danger of the directive's inherent ambiguity. It found that different commanders interpreted the order in radically different ways, with some believing it was a direct mandate to kill a captured soldier to prevent their abduction. The report concluded that the lack of clarity regarding the value of a soldier's life versus the strategic necessity of stopping a kidnapping created an unacceptable ethical and operational risk. In response to these findings, the IDF Chief of Staff at the time, Gadi Eisenkot, formally announced the cancellation of the "Hannibal" name and the directive as it was then understood.

However, the "revocation" was widely viewed by military analysts as a rebranding effort rather than a fundamental change in doctrine. The directive was replaced with three new, more specific orders that were intended to be more restrictive regarding captive safety. These new protocols emphasized that while forces should still act aggressively to foil an abduction, they must do so while taking "all possible measures" to avoid harming the captive. The shift in language was designed to restore a sense of the traditional social contract, reassuring the public and the conscripted ranks that the state still valued the life of the individual soldier over the abstract strategic cost of their capture.

Despite this rebranding, the core logic of preventing the "Arad scenario" remained embedded in the military's DNA. Critics pointed out that the new orders still allowed for massive fire in the vicinity of an abduction, and the "all means necessary" spirit of the original directive continued to influence training and simulations. The 2016 changes were an attempt to sanitize the image of the IDF and provide a stronger legal defense against international war crimes allegations, but they did not erase the institutional memory of Ron Arad. In the high-stress environment of actual combat, the distinction between the "old Hannibal" and the "new orders" often proved to be a distinction without a difference, as the fundamental priority remained the denial of a strategic asset to the enemy.

8. October 7, 2023: The Return of Hannibal

The chaos of the initial breach of the Gaza border fence on October 7, 2023, represented the most extreme operational challenge to the Israel Defense Forces since the 1973 Yom Kippur War. As thousands of militants and civilians poured into southern Israel, the military's command and control systems suffered a near-total collapse. In the resulting vacuum, the "Hannibal" logic—officially revoked but deeply embedded in institutional memory—re-emerged as a desperate tactical response. Reported orders issued during the height of the infiltration instructed units to prevent any vehicles from returning to the Gaza Strip "at any cost." This directive, though phrased as a measure to stop the flow of attackers, inherently applied to vehicles known or suspected to be carrying abducted Israeli soldiers and civilians.

The most harrowing example of this doctrine's application occurred at Kibbutz Be'eri, specifically at the residence of Pessi Cohen. During a standoff involving dozens of militants and 14 Israeli hostages, a Brigadier General reportedly ordered a tank to fire shells into the structure. The resulting explosion and fire killed nearly everyone inside, including 13 of the 14 hostages. Investigations by domestic media and statements from survivors suggest that the decision was made with the full knowledge that hostages were present. The "Be'eri incident" has since become a focal point for critics who argue that the state's priority shifted from "rescue" to "neutralization," effectively treating its own citizens as collateral damage in the effort to deny Hamas the strategic victory of a mass abduction.

Beyond individual incidents, the widespread use of attack helicopters and drones to strike convoys moving toward the Gaza border further complicates the narrative of "protection." In the fog of war, the distinction between a retreating militant and a captive was often impossible to maintain. The implications of these actions suggest that in the face of a systemic threat to national sovereignty, the state defaulted to the harshest interpretation of its captive doctrine. For the families of the hostages, the realization that their loved ones may have been targeted by their own military represents a secondary trauma, one that challenges the very foundation of the Israeli social contract and raises profound questions about the limits of state sacrifice in the modern era.

9. Psychological Warfare: The Hamas Interpretation

The Al-Qassam Brigades, specifically through their spokesperson Abu Ubaida, have demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of the Israeli collective psyche by weaponizing the legacy of Ron Arad. By repeatedly invoking Arad's name in speeches addressed to the families of hostages, Hamas transitions from a military adversary to a psychological architect. The "Arad threat" is a calculated attempt to convince the Israeli public that their government is repeating

the same mistakes made in 1986—namely, prioritizing military ego over the life of the captive. For Hamas, Arad is not just a historical figure; he is a cautionary tale used to suggest that the "window of opportunity" for a deal is perpetually closing, after which the hostages will vanish into an irreversible "black hole" of history.

This rhetoric is designed to incite internal political strife within Israel. By framing the current government under Benjamin Netanyahu as the primary obstacle to the hostages' return, Hamas leverages the "Ron Arad" trauma to turn grief into political rage. They suggest that the Israeli military's continued use of the Hannibal logic—or even its passive variant of allowing hostages to die in combat zones—is a betrayal of the citizens by the state. This strategy aims to force the Israeli leadership into a "prisoner's dilemma": either they agree to a massive, lopsided exchange that weakens national security, or they face a domestic uprising led by families who refuse to let their children become "the next Ron Arad."

Furthermore, Hamas's interpretation of the Arad case serves to delegitimize the IDF's mission. By highlighting the state's willingness to sacrifice its own to prevent a "strategic defeat," Hamas paints the Israeli establishment as a cold, mechanical entity that has abandoned its moral core. In this view, the "evil" of the Hannibal Directive is not just in the act of firing on one's own, but in the state's refusal to acknowledge the humanity of those it claims to protect. By constantly reminding the public of the forty years of silence surrounding Arad, Hamas ensures that the fear of "disappearance" remains a potent weapon, keeping the Israeli society in a state of perpetual anxiety and distrust toward its own military doctrine.

10. The Netanyahu Era: Political Survival vs. Hostage Recovery

In the contemporary era, the legacy of Ron Arad has been channeled through the political lens of Benjamin Netanyahu, whose leadership has become synonymous with a "security-first" doctrine that critics increasingly view as a barrier to hostage recovery. Under Netanyahu, the Israeli government has shifted its focus from the traditional humanitarian imperative of prisoner swaps toward a strategy of maximum military pressure. This approach is predicated on the belief that only by devastating the enemy's infrastructure can the state force a return of its captives—a theory that has faced intense scrutiny as the months of the Gaza war have turned into years. For many families of the abducted, this policy is perceived as a "passive Hannibal" tactic: a systematic decision to allow hostages to perish in combat zones or from the lack of basic necessities, thereby removing the "strategic liability" of their existence without the political cost of a lopsided exchange.

The prioritization of military pressure over a negotiated release has created a profound rift within the Israeli public. Allegations have mounted that the Netanyahu administration has

repeatedly sabotaged potential deals to maintain the stability of a right-wing coalition that views any concession to Hamas as a national surrender. In this political landscape, the hostages are often framed as a tragic but secondary concern compared to the total "dismantling" of the adversary. This "eternal war" posture, as described by former defense officials and members of the negotiating teams, mirrors the darkest aspects of the Arad case—where the state appears more comfortable with the static certainty of a missing soldier than the messy, politically dangerous reality of a compromise.

The role of the Hostage and Missing Families Forum has been pivotal in challenging this state doctrine. By organizing massive nationwide protests and "days of struggle," the families have attempted to reclaim the narrative of "mutual responsibility" that they believe the state has abandoned. They argue that the government's refusal to finalize a deal, even as the bodies of hostages are recovered from ruins, represents a betrayal of the basic social contract. To these families, the "Mr. Security" image cultivated by Netanyahu is a hollow shell that masks a willingness to sacrifice the individual for the sake of political survival and ideological purity. The current era thus stands as the ultimate test of the Hannibal logic: whether a modern democratic state can survive the moral weight of choosing the "security" of the collective over the lives of the citizens it was sworn to protect.

11. Global Comparisons: Captivity Doctrines in Other Nations

The ethical and tactical dilemma of how a state responds to the capture of its service members is not unique to Israel, yet the Hannibal Directive stands as a particularly extreme outlier when compared to the doctrines of other major world powers. In the United States, military policy is guided by the Code of Conduct, which mandates that a prisoner of war must make every effort to escape and refuse to accept special favors from the enemy. However, the American institutional response to capture—epitomized by the "Personnel Recovery" doctrine—is built on the foundation of the "Leave No Man Behind" promise. While the U.S. has engaged in controversial swaps, such as the 2014 exchange of five Taliban detainees for Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, there is no documented American equivalent to a directive that authorizes firing upon one's own captured soldiers to prevent their transport. The U.S. model relies on massive technological and special operations superiority to recover personnel, viewing a live captive as a mission to be solved rather than a liability to be neutralized.

In contrast, the Russian military doctrine historically reflects a more collectivist and utilitarian approach, often mirroring the harshness of the Hannibal logic but without its specific tactical codification. During the conflicts in Chechnya and more recently in Ukraine, Russian forces have frequently employed "scorched earth" tactics in areas where their own soldiers were being held

or ambushed. The Russian state often views the capture of its soldiers as a personal failure of the individual, sometimes leading to the prosecution of returned POWs. This creates a environment where the survival of the captive is secondary to the preservation of the unit's momentum or the state's image of invincibility. However, unlike Israel, Russia does not face the same internal domestic pressure from a highly mobilized "citizen-soldier" parent population, allowing the state to absorb the "loss" of captured personnel with fewer political repercussions.

The United Kingdom and other professional European volunteer forces occupy a middle ground, emphasizing high-risk extraction over sacrifice. The unique pressure on the Israeli Defense Forces stems from its nature as a conscripted "people's army." In a volunteer force like that of the UK, the "contract" between the soldier and the state is professional and transactional; in Israel, it is familial and existential. This makes the existence of a Hannibal-style directive even more jarring in the Israeli context. While a professional army might view a captive as a professional risk of the trade, the Israeli state's adoption of a doctrine that targets its own sons and daughters shatters the myth of the "national family." This comparison reveals that while all nations struggle with the strategic cost of captives, Israel is perhaps the only modern democracy to have institutionalized the "sacrifice of the few for the many" as a formal, albeit secret, military protocol.

12. Conclusion: The Future of the Social Contract

The evolution of the Hannibal Directive, from its clandestine origins in the wake of Ron Arad's disappearance to its overt, devastating application on October 7, 2023, marks a profound transformation in the relationship between the State of Israel and its citizens. What began as a tactical necessity to prevent a long-term strategic "black hole" has matured into a doctrine of state sacrifice that challenges the moral foundations of a conscripted society. The ghost of Ron Arad continues to dictate policy, not through the hope of his return, but through the fear of his replacement. By prioritizing the denial of a "strategic asset" over the individual life of the soldier or civilian, the state has effectively signaled that the collective security of the many outweighs the sacred obligation to the one.

This shift has created a precarious future for the Israeli social contract. The "People's Army" model relies on a deep, reciprocal trust: the citizen gives their youth and potentially their life to the state, and in return, the state promises to value that life above all else. When that contract is replaced by the cold mathematics of the Hannibal logic, the motivation for service and national unity is placed under extreme duress. As the Netanyahu era continues to navigate the fallout of the current conflict, the tension between military "total victory" and the humanitarian recovery of hostages has reached a breaking point. The state may successfully prevent the next

Ron Arad through force, but in doing so, it risks losing the very moral legitimacy that sustains its citizen-soldier ranks.

Ultimately, the legacy of Ron Arad serves as a mirror reflecting the hardening of the Israeli heart. To avoid the pain of uncertainty and the high price of compromise, the state has embraced the certainty of the grave. The future of this doctrine will likely be defined by the upcoming domestic commissions of inquiry and the persistent activism of the hostage families, who refuse to let the state "Hannibalize" their loved ones for the sake of political or military expediency. As we look toward the mid-2020s, the central question remains: can a nation truly be secure if its citizens fear their own protectors as much as their captors? The answer to this question will determine whether the Israeli social contract can be repaired or if the ghost of Ron Arad will haunt the nation’s conscience for generations to come.

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